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Abstract
Spanish convertible bonds are different from American convertible bonds. First, the
conversion price is not fixed in pesetas, but is defined as a percentage discount off the
average share price over a number of days before conversion.  Second, the conversion option
can be exercised only at a few (usually two or three) different dates. Third, the first
conversion opportunity is usually only two or three months after the subscription (issue) date.
In the period 1984 to 1990, 248 issues of convertibles accounted for 1.9
trillion pesetas. In this period, companies issued more convertibles than new shares
(1.4 trillion pesetas).
Several formulas for valuing Spanish convertible bonds are derived using option
theory. Convertibles have been undervalued by an average of 21.6%. The expropriation effect
in the period 1984 to 1990 amounts to 125 billion pesetas.
JEL Classification:  G10CONVERTIBLE BONDS IN SPAIN: A DIFFERENT SECURITY*
1. Introduction
Until 1983, almost every Spanish firm that issued new stock used the rights
procedure1. More recently, a growing number of firms are raising new equity by issuing
convertible bonds. However, Spanish convertible bonds are different from
American convertible bonds. First, the conversion price of the shares is not fixed in pesetas,
but is defined as a percentage discount off the share price on the day before conversion2.
Second, the conversion option can be exercised at only a few (usually two or three) different
dates. Third, the bonds normally do not have call provisions, although a few are callable after
the first conversion date. Fourth, the first conversion opportunity is usually only two or three
months after the subscription (issue) date.
The usual structure of the convertible bonds issued in Spain is as follows: Prior to
the issue date (on which companies issue the convertibles and investors pay the subscription
price), shareholders have a period of usually 30 days to decide whether they want to
subscribe or not. After this period, non-shareholder investors can subscribe for the bonds that
shareholders did not want.The first conversion opportunity is usually 2 to 6 months after the
issue date. There is a period of usually 30 days (called average days) in which the average of
the share price is computed (Saverage). Then, bondholders have a period of 30 days to decide
whether to convert or not. The number of shares they can get in exchange for each bond is
B/(1-d)Saverage, where B is the nominal value of the bond and d the discount that is specified
in the contract3.
An example will illustrate the structure of a typical Spanish convertible bond.
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Finance at IESE.Issuer: Asland, S.A. Issue of 30 billion pesetas. 
•  Bond face value (par): 100,000 pesetas.
•  Subscription price: 100% of par value, without fees or commissions for the
investor.
•  Annual interest of the bonds: 10%. Coupon paid semi-annually.
•  Subscription period: 
–  Preferred for shareholders. 1 bond for each 83 shares. June 14, 1988 to June 25,
1988.
–  For non-shareholders: June 26, 1988 to July 15, 1988.
•  Issue date: July 15, 1988.
•  Maturity of the bonds: July 15, 1991. Bonds not converted will be redeemed at
par plus accrued interest.
•  Conversion options:
–  First: October 10, 1988. Value of the bond: 104,548 pesetas (par plus accrued
interest)4. Value of the shares: discount of 20% on the average price of the shares during the
months of August and September 1988 on the Madrid Stock Exchange. The shares will be
valued at least at par value (500 pesetas).
–  Second: April 10, 1989. Value of the bond: 104,548 pesetas (par plus accrued
interest). Value of the shares: discount of 15% on the average price of the shares during the
months of February and March 1989 on the Madrid Stock Exchange.
– Third: July 15, 1991. Value of the bond: 100,000 pesetas (without accrued
interest). Value of the shares: discount of 10% on the average price of the shares during the
months of February and March 1989 on the Madrid Stock Exchange.
The shares will be valued, in the three conversion options, at least at par value: 500
pesetas5.
•  Liquidity. Trading on the convertible bonds on the secondary market will be
requested, but trading will not take place before the first conversion
opportunity.
At the first conversion opportunity, the shares were valued at 826.4% (4,132 pesetas)
and the bondholders had the period October 10 to October 28, 1988 to decide whether to
convert or not. Each bond could be exchanged for 25.302 shares (104,548/4,132). The share
price on October 28, 1988 was 998%.
Many authors have derived formulae to find the theoretical value of American
convertible bonds6, that is, convertibles with a fixed conversion price. But Spanish
convertibles, that is, convertibles based on a discount for conversion, have not yet been
valued.
2In this paper, we analyze all the convertibles issued in Spain in the five-year period
January 1984-December 1990. 107 companies issued 248 convertibles during this period.
Table 1 offers evidence of the popularity of convertible bonds in Spain in the period
1984-1990. In 1994 there were only 3 issues (Tubacex, Anaya and Mapfre), accounting for
21.5 billion pesetas. In 1993 there were only 4 issues (Tudor, Agromán, Transfesa and
Miquel Costas), accounting for 11,5 billion pesetas. In 1992, issues of convertible bonds
accounted for 105 billion pesetas.
In 1986, issues of convertible bonds were more than three times the number of
issues of new shares. In fact, direct issues of stock went down in 1986 in part because
corporations issued a considerable amount of convertible debt. The reduction in convertibles
issued in 1987 resulted from a decrease in convertibles from electric utilities, which were 148
billion in 1986 and only 11 in 1987 (see Table 2). The reason for this decline is that, by law,
companies cannot issue new stock below par value, and during 1987 the shares of most
electric utilities traded below par. Table 2 shows that an increasing number of companies are
using convertible bonds. Table 3 shows the most frequent issuers of convertible bonds in the
period 1984-1990. 17 companies (mainly banks, electric companies, Telefónica and Asland)
account for 74% of the volume issued, but only 42 % of the number of issues.
Most convertibles have more than one conversion opportunity. Convertibles are
structured in such a way that the conditions of the first conversion opportunity are the most
favorable for bondholders. The only unfavorable circumstance for bondholders occurs when
the share price falls substantially during the average period or during the conversion period.
Table 4 shows that for most convertibles the first conversion opportunity arises within six
months after the issue (subscription) date. Table 5 offers evidence that the first conversion
opportunity is ex-ante the most advantageous for bondholders.
Before an issue of convertible bonds can be offered, the company must prepare a
prospectus and present it to the Ministry of Economy and Finance. After approval is granted,
the shareholders normally have one month in which to subscribe. After this month, there is
another month of open subscription, in which non-shareholder investors can subscribe to the
rest of the issue. The subscription orders only include the quantity of bonds, because the price
is fixed in the prospectus. If there is oversubscription, the issue is allocated among the
investors on a pro-rata basis, although orders below one million pesetas are normally fully
covered.
An important point to note here is that a bond’s issue price remains fixed for a
minimum period of two months (assuming approval is given immediately). This is
particularly important for issues with a minimum conversion factor, because their values are
very sensitive to the share price.
2. An empirical analysis
2.1. Evidence of the Undervaluation of Spanish Convertible Bonds
In section 3, we will derive formulae to value convertible bonds issued in Spain. In
this section, we apply these formulae to the 248 issues in our sample. Table 6 shows the
results of this procedure. We have calculated the value of the convertibles at the subscription
date. The theoretical value is reported as a percentage of the nominal value (par) of the
3bonds. This value must be compared with the subscription price of the bonds, which is
always 100% of the nominal value7.
Table 6 shows that all issues of convertible bonds were initially undervalued. Larger
issues were less underpriced: the average value was 121.6%, but the average value weighted
by volume was 116.4%.
An implication of the undervaluation should be the realization of abnormal returns
for bondholders. Table 7 shows the distribution of the discounted gain obtained by
bondholders. We define the discounted gain as the gain over an equivalent fixed income
instrument8. For example, consider a company that simultaneously issued convertible and
straight bonds, both with a subscription price of 100. Conversion occurred one year later, and
the conversion value was 132. The annual coupon of the fixed income instrument was 10%,
so the value of the straight bond at the conversion date was 110. The discounted gain was
therefore 20% ([132/110] - 1).
The discounted gain can be directly compared with the value that we calculated: a
20% discounted gain corresponds to a value of 120%. Table 7 shows that bondholders had,
on average, substantial abnormal returns. Smaller issues have been more profitable: the
average discounted gain was 22.5%, while the average discounted gain weighted by the
volume was 16.8%.
The average annual gain of the Madrid Stock Exchange in the period 1984-1988 was
38%. This extraordinary increase in the index accounts for the difference between the
average value that we calculated (121.6%) and the average discounted gain9 (22.5%).
To study the relationship between the valuation (ex-ante) and the discounted gain
(ex-post), we have constructed Table 8. It shows that the valuation that we have done is a
good predictor of the ex-post performance of the bonds. By buying the bonds that we claim
are more valuable, we would have obtained a larger discounted gain.
2.2. Conversion behavior
Most of the issues have a maximum subscription covenant: the maximum volume
that can be subscribed by each investor is limited to one million pesetas in many issues. For
this reason, we are not considering any sequential optimal exercise. We should expect that all
bonds either be converted or not. It is irrational to convert only a portion of the issue. Table 9
shows the proportion of each issue that was converted at the first opportunity, as a function of
the discounted gain obtained by bondholders that converted10. 
Table 9 shows that a substantial part of the issues was not converted when it should
have been, and that many bondholders converted when they should not have. The losses
incurred by bondholders that did not convert when they should have amount to more than 50
billion pesetas, while the losses incurred by bondholders that did convert when they should
not have amount to more than 2 billion pesetas.
2.3. Subscription behavior
As shareholders have the privilege of subscribing the undervalued bonds before
other investors, we should expect that they would subscribe the entire issue. Table 10 shows
4that this is not the case. There are many attractive (undervalued) issues that are only partially
subscribed by shareholders. This situation is similar to shareholders having the possibility of
buying dollars paying only 80 cents and refusing to do so. From Table 10 we can conclude
that shareholders are not fully aware of the undervaluation of the convertible bonds. We can
also detect this lack of awareness in the fact that (to the best of our knowledge) shareholders
have never asked for a protection from the expropriation of wealth they suffer when outside
investors buy the undervalued convertibles.
2.4. Transfer of wealth from shareholders to bondholders
The undervaluation of the bonds, together with the limited subscription of the issues
by shareholders, produces a substantial transfer of wealth from shareholders to outside
investors that subscribe convertibles. Wealth is taken away from the shareholders that do not
subscribe (or subscribe a smaller proportion of the issue than the proportion of shares that
they hold) and is given to the outsiders that do subscribe. The shareholders usually have the
right to subscribe, but it does not mean that they are fully protected against
the undervaluation of the convertibles when issued, because they cannot sell the right to
subscribe undervalued convertibles when they do not want (or forget) to subscribe. If the
shareholders do not want to subscribe, the bonds are offered to the public, but
the shareholders do not receive any compensation. The transfer of wealth for the 248 issues
amounts to more than 125 billion pesetas ($1.0 billion).
3. Valuation of zero coupon bonds convertible at a discount
Many authors have derived formulas to find the theoretical value of American
convertible bonds11. But Spanish convertibles, that is, convertibles with a discount
for conversion, have not yet been valued. The following sections of this paper will deal with
the valuation of this kind of convertible bond, following the method first developed by
Robert Merton (1984)12.
Useful insights into the valuation of Spanish convertibles can be obtained by first
simplifying the instrument and then gradually complicating it. Specific features can then be
grafted on to the basic model.
In this section, we consider a simplified convertible zero coupon bond. Consider the
following numerical example. 
3.1. Numerical example
Company A has 1,000 shares outstanding and 120 convertible bonds. These
convertibles are like zero coupon bonds with an option to convert that can be exercised only
at the maturity of the bond. At maturity, the owner of a convertible bond has the following
options:
– Convert the bond into shares. In the conversion, the bond will be valued at face
value ($1,000) and the shares at 75% of the price at the maturity date.
– Not convert and get the face value of the bond ($1,000)
5Let S be the share price at the maturity date of the convertible bond and V the total
value of Company A13. At maturity, a convertible can be exchanged into: 1000 / 0.75 S
shares. At maturity, the convertible bond will be converted if its conversion value is higher




——————————— V  > 120,000
1000
120 x ————   +  1000
0.75 S
The total value of Company A has to be the sum of the value of the convertibles and




——————————— V   +  1000 S   =   V         (1)
1000
120 x ————  +  1000
0.75 S
With a little algebra, equation (1) can be rewritten as:
S  =  ( V / 1000)  -  160                     (2)
Due to the limited liability of the shareholders of Company A, the price of the shares
cannot be negative. So, one restriction for the conversion of all the bonds assumed in
equation (1) is that V must be at least $160,000. Notice also that for V=$160,000 the shares
are worthless. In this extreme situation, every bondholder will convert, getting an infinite
number of shares, each with a price of zero.
The value of each convertible at maturity (assuming V > 160,000) will be:
V  -  1000 S                 160,000
——————    =  —————   =   $1,333.33
120                        120
The number of new shares issued will be:
1000              160,000,000
120  x  ————  =  ———————
0.75 S           V  -  160,000
If the value of Company A is less than $120,000 (the face value of the bonds) at the
maturity date, the company will default, the shares will be worthless and the bondholders will
be the new owners of the company. But, what happens when the value of Company A is
between $120,000 and $160,000? One way to answer this question is to imagine that only
some bondholders will convert and others will not. Suppose that c bonds are converted and
120-c are not. Then equation (1) is no longer valid and must be replaced by equation (3):     
61000
c  x  ———
0.75 S
———————— [ V - 1000 (120 - c)]  + 1000 (120 - c)  + 1000 S =V    (3)
1000
c  x  ———   +  1000
0.75 S
Equation (3) indicates that the value of the bonds converted, plus the value of the
bonds not converted plus the value of the old shares, must be the total value of the company.
Some algebra permits us to rewrite equation (3) as:
S  =  ( V / 1000)  -  120  -  ( c/3 ) (4)
The restrictions to equation (4) are: S ³ 0 ; 0 < c < 120 ; and 120,000 < V < 160,000.
After equation (2) we know that the price of the shares must be zero for this range of values of
V. For example, if V = $130,000, then 30 bonds will be converted, getting an infinite number
of shares, each worth nothing. This means that the owners of these 30 convertibles will get the
total value of Company A after paying the 90 bonds not converted. So, the bondholders that
convert will get $40,000, and the bondholders that do not convert will get $90,000. This
situation creates a problem: some bonds (the non-converted) have a value at maturity of
$1,000, while others (the converted) have a value of $1,333.33. This situation can be solved
by forming a bondholders’ association that divides the proceeds at maturity. But it can be
solved more easily by considering the firm to be in default, unless its value exceeds $160,000.
At maturity, the payoff of the 120 convertible bonds can be written as:
$160,000        if  V  >  $160,000
V i f  V  ≤ $160,000
And the payoff of the 1,000 shares:
V  -  $160,000    if  V  >  $160,000
0 if  V  ≤ $160,000
This is exactly the same payoff as an issue of zero coupon bonds with face value of
$160,000 would have had, had they been issued instead of the convertibles. If the
convertibles were issued one year ago, and at that time the discount for straight and risky
zero coupon bonds with one year to maturity was 10%, then the price of a convertible one
year ago had to be $1,212.12 ($1,333.33/1.1), if it were properly priced. Note, however, that
the capital structure of the company would have been different in the two cases. If it issues
convertibles, the company will remain all-equity financed after conversion, whereas if it
issued straight bonds, the company would have to decide how to finance the redemption,
whether with new equity or new debt. With the convertible bonds, the company already made
this choice when the convertibles were issued. 
For V = $160,000, the share price is zero and the number of shares tends to infinity,
but the share price times the number of shares equals $160,000.
At any other moment prior to maturity we can consider the value of the stock as a
call option on the firm with striking price of $160,000.
1000 St =  C ( Vt , $160,000 )
7The value of the convertibles will be Vt - C ( Vt , $160,000 ), where Vt and St are
the value of the firm and the share price at time t.
Another way of solving the valuation problem of the convertible bonds is to
consider each convertible bond as a straight bond with a put option embedded in it14. The put
option allows the bondholder to sell the bond back to the company at maturity for $1,333.33.
If every bondholder exercises his put, the company will need to pay –at the maturity of the
bonds– $160,000 ($1,333.33 x 120). If the value of Company A (V) is less than $160,000,
the company will default and the bondholders will become the new owners. Each rational
bondholder will exercise his put option because by doing so he gets $1,333.33 per bond if the
value of the company is greater than $160,000. Otherwise, he gets only $1,000 per bond.
The valuation of the convertible can also be derived in another way. Each bond can
be converted at maturity into 1,000 / ( 0.75 S- ) shares, where S- is the share price just before
conversion. If S+ is the share price just after conversion, then the value of a converted bond
at maturity will be ( 1,000 S+ ) / ( 0.75 S- ). But S- = S+ = S , because otherwise there would
be riskless arbitrage opportunities. So, the value of a converted bond at maturity will be 1,000
/ 0.75 = $1,333.33. This approach facilitates the recognition of the fact that the firm will
default at maturity unless its value is greater than $160,000.
3.2. Convertible bonds with accrued interest for conversion
In this section, I will generalize the results that we have already developed in the
numerical example of the previous section.
A company has n shares outstanding and q convertible bonds. These convertibles are
like zero coupon bonds with an option to convert that can be exercised only at the maturity of
the bond. Each convertible was sold for its face value $b. The total revenue for the company
was B = q b. The owner of a convertible bond has -at maturity- the following options:
– Convert the bond into shares. In the conversion, the bond will be valued at face
value plus accrued interest ( b [ 1+r ] ) and the shares at a discount d off the price at the
maturity date. So, at maturity, a bond can be exchanged for ( b [ 1+r ] ) / ( [ 1 - d ] S ) shares.
– Not to convert but to receive the face value of the bond plus accrued interest
(b [1+r] ).
Let S be the share price at the maturity date of the convertible bonds. Let V be the
total value of the company15. The total value of the company has to be the sum of the value
of the convertibles and the value of the shares:
B ( 1 + r )
—————
( 1 - d ) S
————————  V   +  n S   =   V         (5)
B ( 1 + r )
—————   +  n
( 1 - d ) S    
8With a little algebra we can rewrite equation (5) as:
1                   B ( 1 + r )
S  =  ——  { V  -  —————  } (6)
n                      1 - d
Due to the limited liability of shareholders, the price of the shares cannot be
negative. So, one restriction for the conversion of all the bonds assumed in equation (5) is
that V must be equal to or bigger than B ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ). Notice also that for V = [ B ( 1 +
r ) ] / [ 1 - d ] the shares will be worthless. In this extreme situation, every bondholder will
convert, receiving an infinite number of shares with price zero.
If converted, the value of the convertible bonds at maturity will be:
B ( 1 + r )
V - n S  =  —————  
1 - d
The number of new shares issued will be:
B ( 1 + r )                           B ( 1 + r )
N   =    —————     =     n   —————————— (7)
( 1 - d ) S                     V ( 1 - d )  -  B ( 1 + r )
If the value of the company is smaller than the total payment due to the bondholders
at the maturity date, B ( 1 + r ) , then the company will default, the shares will be worthless
and the bondholders will be the new owners of the company. But, what happens when the
value of the company at maturity lies between B[ 1 + r ] and B ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ) ? Again, one
possibility is that only some bondholders will convert and others will not. Suppose that c
bonds are converted and [ B / b ] - c  are not. Then equation (5) is no longer valid and must
be replaced by equation (8):
c b ( 1 + r )
—————
( 1 - d ) S
————— [ V - ( B - bc ) ( 1 + r ) ] + ( B - bc ) ( 1 + r ) + n S = V  (8)
c b ( 1 + r )
—————  +  n
( 1 - d ) S        
Some algebra will allow us to rewrite equation (8) as:
c b ( 1 + r )
—————   +  ( B - bc ) ( 1 + r ) +  n S   =   V  (9)
( 1 - d ) 
Equations (8) and (9) indicate that the value of the bonds converted, plus the value
of the bonds not converted plus the value of the old shares, must be the total value of the
company. After equation (6) we know that the price of the shares must be zero for V < B(1+
r) / (1-d). The number of converted bonds will be:
V  -  B ( 1 + r )    ( 1 - d ) B ( 1 + r  )
c  =   ——————   ————    for  B ( 1 + r )  <  V  <    —————
b ( 1 + r )              d ( 1 - d )
9This situation creates a problem: some bonds have at maturity a value of b ( 1 + r ),
while others (the converted) have a value of [b ( 1 + r )] / [1 - d]. This situation can be solved
by forming a bondholders’ association that divides the proceeds at maturity. But it can be
solved more easily by considering the firm to be in default, unless its value is greater than
B(1+ r)/(1-d).
The valuation of the convertible can also be derived in another way. Each bond can
be converted at maturity into b ( 1 + r ) / [ ( 1 - d ) S- ] shares, where S- is the share price just
before conversion. If S+ is the share price just after conversion, then the value of a converted
bond at maturity will be [ b ( 1 + r ) S+ ] / [ ( 1 - d ) S- ] . But S- = S+ = S , because otherwise
there would be riskless arbitrage opportunities. So, the value of a converted bond at maturity
will be b ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ). This approach facilitates recognition of the fact that the firm will
default unless its value is greater than B ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ).
At maturity, the payoff of the B/b convertible bonds can be written as:
[ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ]      if  V  >   [ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ]
V if  V  ≤ [ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ]
And the payoff of the n shares:
V  -   [ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ]        if  V  >   [ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ]
0 if  V  ≤ [ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ]
This is exactly the same payoff as an issue of zero coupon bonds paying [ B (1 + r) ]
/ [ 1 - d ] at maturity would have had, had they been issued instead of the convertibles. Note,
however, that the capital structure of the company would have been different in the two
cases. If it issues convertibles, the company will remain all-equity financed after conversion,
whereas if it issued straight bonds, the company would have to decide how to finance the
redemption: whether with new equity or with new debt. With the convertible bonds,
the company already made this choice when the convertibles were issued. 
At any other moment prior to maturity we can consider the value of the stock as a
call option on the firm with striking price of B (1 + r) / ( 1 - d ).
n St =   C ( Vt ,   [ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ] ) (10)
And the value of the convertibles will be 
CONVt = Vt - C ( Vt , [ B ( 1 + r ) ] / [ 1 - d ]),  (11)
where Vt and St are the value of the firm and the share price at time t.
As indicated before, we have assumed that each convertible bond was sold for its
face value b and with an interest rate r. If the market interest rate at that time for straight zero
coupon bonds with the same maturity and equivalent risk was R, then an investor would be
indifferent between buying a convertible and buying a straight bond if their payoffs at
maturity were equal, that is, if:   b ( 1 + R ) = b ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ). Therefore, if properly
priced, the interest rate and the discount of the convertibles must follow relationship (12)
r = ( 1 + R ) ( 1 - d ) - 1       (12)
103.3. Convertible bonds without accrued interest
These convertibles are exactly like the convertibles in section 2.2, except that for
conversion the bonds are not valued at face value plus accrued interest ( b [ 1+ r ] ) , but only
at face value b. Following the same procedure as in the previous section, we derive the
following results. 
The bonds will be converted only if their conversion value is higher than the face
value of the bond plus accrued interest: B / ( 1 - d ) > B ( 1 + r ). This means that the
conversion feature will have value only if ( 1 - d ) ( 1 + r ) < 1. For any other moment prior to
maturity the value of the convertibles will be Ct= Vt - C ( Vt ,  B / ( 1 - d ) ), where Vt and St
are the value of the firm and the share price at time t. If the market interest rate at that time
for straight zero coupon bonds with the same maturity and equivalent risk were R, then an
investor would be indifferent between buying a convertible and buying a straight bond with
equal payoffs at maturity, that is, if: b ( 1 + R ) = b / ( 1 - d ). Therefore, if properly priced,
the discount of the convertible bonds must follow the relationship ( 1 + R ) ( 1 - d ) = 1.
4.Valuation of convertibles with maximum conversion factor
In this section we develop formulas to value convertible zero coupon bonds with
maximum conversion factor. These bonds will represent a better approximation to the
convertible bonds issued in Spain because, by law, new shares cannot be issued below par
value16.
4.1. Numerical example
Suppose now that Company A issued the same convertibles discussed in 2.1, but
with an additional feature:
– For conversion, the shares will be valued at least at $150/share.
This is equivalent to placing a restriction on the number of shares for which a
convertible bond can be exchanged. Namely, a bond can be converted into a maximum of
6.67 shares ( 1,000 / 150 ). By this means we achieve a closer approximation to real
convertibles because, by law, new stock cannot be issued below par, that is, below 100% of
the nominal price of the shares.




————————— V +  1000 S   =   V  ;  k = MAX [ 150 ,  0.75 S ]    (13)
1000
120 x ——— + 1000
k
11The bond will be converted if its conversion value is greater than $1,000. Then, from
equation (13):
V  -  1000 S                 V
——————  =  —————  >  1000 (14)
120                  k  +  120
If k = 150, it means that 150 < S < 200 , and $270,000 < V < $360,000. For this
range of values, V = 1800 S. The number of new shares in this interval is constant and equal
to 800. As the number of new shares is constant, the value of the convertibles is a constant
fraction (44.44%) of the total value of the company (800 / 1800 ). For V = $270,000, the
value of the convertibles is $120,000, the face value. For V = $360,000, the value of
the convertibles is $160,000.
When the value of the company is greater than $360,000, which means that the share
price is higher than $200, then k = 0.75 S. In this interval, equation (1) holds.
When the value of Company A is less than $120,000 (the face value of the bonds) at
the maturity date, the company will default, the shares will be worthless and the bondholders
will be the new owners of the company. When the value of the company lies between
$120,000 and $270,000, the bonds will not be converted.
At maturity, the payoff of the 120 convertible bonds can be written as:
$160,000     if  $360,000 < V  
0.4444 V if  $270,000 < V ≤ $360,000
$120,000     if  $120,000 < V ≤ $270,000
V if  V ≤ $120,000
And the payoff of the 1000 shares:
V - $160,000  if  $360,000 < V  
0.5555 V if  $270,000 < V ≤ $360,000
V - $120,000   if  $120,000 < V ≤ $270,000
0 if  V ≤ $120,000
For any other moment prior to maturity, we can consider the value of the
convertibles as a combination of call options on the firm with different striking prices. Vt and
St are the value of the firm and the share price at time t . Note that 800/1800 = 0.4444.
800 800
Ct =  Vt -   C ( Vt , $120,000 )  +  ––––  C ( Vt , $270,000 )  -  ––––  C ( Vt , $360,000 )
1800 1800
4.2. Convertible bonds with accrued interest
Now we consider the same convertibles discussed in 3.2, but with an additional
feature:
– For conversion, the shares will be valued at least at M/share.
12This is equivalent to placing a restriction on the number of shares into which a
convertible bond can be converted. Namely, a bond can be converted into a maximum of b (
1 + r ) / M shares. 
In this case, equation (5) must be transformed into:
B ( 1 + r )
————
k
—————  V   +  n S   =   V  ;      k = MAX [ M ,  ( 1 - d ) S ]       (15)
B ( 1 + r )
————   +  n
k               
If k = M, it means that S < M/ (1 - d), and conversion will take place for M < S < M/
(1 - d) , and nM + B (1+r) < V < [nM + B(1+r)] / [1-d]. For these values, V = [nM + B (1+r )]
S/M. The number of new shares in this interval is constant and equal to B (1 + r ) / M. As the
number of new shares is constant, the value of the convertibles is a constant fraction of the
total value of the company. For V = nM + B (1 + r), the value of the convertibles is B (1 + r).
For V = [nM + B ( 1 + r )] / [ 1 - d ], the value of the convertibles is B ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ).
When the value of the company is greater than [nM + B (1 + r )]/[ 1 - d ], which
means that the share price is higher than M/ (1 - d), then k = (1-d) S. In this interval, equation
(5) holds.
When the value of Company A is less than B ( 1 + r ) (the promised payment to the
bonds) at the maturity date, the company will default, the shares will be worthless and
the bondholders will be the new owners of the company. When the value of the company lies
between B (1 + r ) and nM + B ( 1 + r ), the bonds will not be converted.
At maturity, the payoff of the convertible bonds can be written as:
B ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ) if   [nM + B ( 1 + r )] / [ 1 - d ]  <  V    
B ( 1 + r )
———————  V if   nM + B (1 + r)  <  V  ≤ [nM + B (1 + r)] / [1 - d]
nM  +  B ( 1 + r )
B ( 1 + r )        if   B ( 1 + r )  <  V  ≤ nM + B ( 1 + r )
V if   V  ≤ B ( 1 + r )
And the payoff of the n shares:
V  -  [ B ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d ) ]   if   [nM + B ( 1 + r )] / [ 1 - d ]  <  V    
nM  
————————  V    if   nM + B (1 + r) < V ≤ [nM + B ( 1 + r )] / [ 1 - d]
nM  +  B ( 1 + r )     
V  -  B ( 1 + r )        if   B ( 1 + r )  <  V  ≤ nM + B ( 1 + r )
0 if   V  ≤ B ( 1 + r )
13For any other moment prior to maturity, we can consider the value of the
convertibles Ct as a combination of call options on the firm with different striking prices. Vt
and St are the value of the firm and the share price at time t.
B (1 + r)                                                           nM + B (1 + r)
Ct = Vt – C ( Vt ,  B (1 + r) ) +  ——— [ C ( Vt , nM + B (1 + r) )  –  C ( Vt  , —————) ]  (16)
nM + B (1 + r) ( 1 - d )       
4.3. Convertible bonds without accrued interest for conversion
These convertibles are exactly like the convertibles in section 4.2, except that for
conversion the bonds are not valued at face value plus accrued interest ( b [ 1+ r ] ) , but only
at face value b. Following the same procedure as in the previous section, we derive the
following results. 
At maturity, the payoff of the convertible bonds can be written as:
B  / ( 1 - d )        if   (nM + B ) / ( 1 - d )  <  V    
B 
————  V    if  (nM + B ) ( 1 + r )  <  V  ≤ (nM + B ) / ( 1 - d )
nM  +  B          
B ( 1 + r )        if   B ( 1 + r )  <  V  ≤ (nM + B ) ( 1 + r )
V if   V  ≤ B ( 1 + r )
For any other moment prior to maturity, we can consider the value of the
convertibles Ct as a combination of call options on the firm with different striking prices. Vt
and St are the value of the firm and the share price at time t.
B  nM + B 
Ct = Vt – C ( Vt , B (1 + r) ) + ———— [C ( Vt , [nM + B] [1 + r] ) – C ( Vt ,———— )  ]        (17)
nM + B  ( 1 - d )
5. Valuation of convertible bonds with maximum and minimum conversion factor
5.1. Numerical example
Suppose now that Company A issued the same convertibles discussed in 3.1, but
with two additional features:
– For conversion, the shares will be valued at most at $225/share.
– For conversion, the shares will be valued at least at $150/share.
14This is equivalent to placing a restriction on the number of shares that a convertible
bond can be exchanged for. Namely, a bond can be converted into a maximum of 6.67 shares
( 1,000 / 150 ) and a minimum of 4.44 shares ( 1,000 / 225 ). 
These two features give a closer approximation to some real convertibles. By law,
new stock cannot be issued below par. 




––––––––––––––––– V   +  1000 S  =  V ;   k =  MIN (  225,  MAX [ 150 ,  0.75 S ]    (18)
1000 
120 x ––––– + 1000
k
Following the same procedure as in the previous sections, k will have different
values for different intervals of S and V:
k = $150  S ≤ 200 270,000 < V ≤ 360,000
k = 0.75 S  200 < S ≤ 300 360,000 < V ≤ 460,000
k = $225  300 < S 460,000 < V 
At maturity, the payoff of the 120 convertible bonds can be written as:
0.3478 V if  $460,000  < V
$160,000     if  $360,000  < V ≤ $460,000
0.4444 V     if  $270,000  < V ≤ $360,000
$120,000    if  $120,000  < V ≤ $270,000
V if  V ≤ $120,000
For any other moment prior to maturity, we can consider the value of the
convertibles as a combination of call options on the firm with different striking prices. Vt and
St are the value of the firm and the share price at time t.
800
Ct  = Vt -  C ( Vt , $120,000 )  +  ––––{ C ( Vt , $270,000 ) - C ( Vt , $360,000 ) } +
1800
533.33 
– ––––––– C ( Vt , $460,000 ) 
1533.33 
5.2. Convertible bonds with accrued interest for conversion
Now we consider the same convertibles discussed in 3.2, but with two additional
features:
– For conversion, the shares will be valued at least at M/share.
– For conversion, the shares will be valued at most at L/share (L > M).
15This is equivalent to placing a restriction on the number of shares that a convertible
bond can be exchanged for. Namely, a bond can be converted into a minimum of b ( 1 + r ) /
L shares and into a maximum of b ( 1 + r ) / M shares. 
In this case, equation (1) must be transformed into:
B ( 1 + r )
————
k
——————— V + n S = V ;  k = MIN ( L, MAX [M , ( 1 - d ) S] )   (19)
B ( 1 + r )
————  + n
k      
Following the same procedure as in the previous sections, k will have different
values for different intervals of S and V:
k = M  S ≤ M / (1 - d)  nM + B (1 + r) < V ≤ [nM + B (1 + r)] / [1 - d]
k = (1 - d) S  M / (1 - d) < S ≤ L / (1 - d) [nM + B (1 + r)] / [1 - d] < V ≤ [nL + B (1+ r)] / [1-d]
k = L  L / (1 - d) < S [nL + B (1 + r)] / [1 - d]  < V 
At maturity, the payoff of the B/b convertible bonds can be written as:
B ( 1 + r )
——————— V   if  [nL + B ( 1 + r )] / [ 1 - d ] < V
nL + B ( 1 + r ) 
B ( 1 + r ) / ( 1 - d )   if [nM + B (1 + r)] / [1 - d] < V ≤ [nL + B ( 1 + r )] / [1 - d ]
B ( 1 + r )
———————— V if  nM + B ( 1 + r ) < V ≤ [nM + B (1 + r)] / [1 - d]
nM + B ( 1 + r )  
B ( 1 + r )     if  B ( 1 + r ) < V ≤ nM + B ( 1 + r )
V if  V ≤ B ( 1 + r )
For any other moment prior to maturity, we can consider the value of the
convertibles Ct as a combination of call options on the firm with different striking prices. Vt
and St are the value of the firm and the share price at time t. 
B(1+r)      
Ct =Vt - C ( Vt , B (1+r) ) +—————{C ( Vt , B (1+r) + nM ) - C ( Vt , [nM + B (1 + r)] / [1 - d] } +
B (1+r) + nM
B (1+r)
(20) +  ————     C ( Vt , [nL + B ( 1 + r )] / [ 1 - d ] )
B (1+r) + nL  
165.3. Convertible bonds without accrued interest for conversion
Following the same procedure as in the previous section, we derive the following
results.
At maturity, the payoff of the B/b convertible bonds can be written as:
B 
———— V   if  [nL + B ] / [ 1 - d ] < V
nL + B  
B / ( 1 - d )     if [nM + B ] / [1 - d] < V ≤ [nL + B ] / [1 - d ]
B 
———— V   if  (nM + B) ( 1 + r ) < V ≤ [nM + B ] / [1 - d]
nM + B   
B ( 1 + r )     if  B ( 1 + r ) < V ≤ (nM + B )( 1 + r )
V if  V ≤ B ( 1 + r )
For any other moment prior to maturity, we can consider the value of the
convertibles Ct as a combination of call options on the firm with different striking prices.
B      
Ct = Vt – C ( Vt , B (1+r) ) + ——— { C ( Vt , (B + nM)(1+r) ) - C ( Vt , [nM + B] / [1 - d] } -
B + nM
B 
(21)  +  ———— C ( Vt , [nL + B ] / [ 1 - d ] ) 
B + nL  
6. Extensions of the valuation formulas
In this section we will introduce the different characteristics of Spanish convertible
bonds into the valuation procedure. These characteristics were not taken into account in the
simplified models considered in sections 3, 4, and 5. In reality, convertible bonds are not zero
coupon bonds. Nevertheless, as we shall see in this section, to consider Spanish convertibles
as zeros is a very good approximation. Now we shall look at the characteristics that are left
out by considering the bonds as zeros:
– The bonds have more than one conversion opportunity
– Conversion occurs before maturity
– Bondholders do not convert immediately, but have a period of 10 to 30 days
(conversion period) to decide whether to convert or not.
– The discount is not calculated on the share price of one day, but rather on the
average of prices over a number of days.
17These four characteristics favor the bondholders. We shall argue that only the
average introduces a significant difference to our previous valuation approach. 
6.1. Convertibles with more than one conversion opportunity
Suppose now that the convertible bonds in section 4.1. have two conversion dates
and that at each one the bond is valued at face value plus accrued interest. The shares are
valued at a discount d1 on the first conversion date and d2 on the second conversion date. The
accrued interest is r1 at the first conversion date and r2 at the second one. There are no
coupon payments between the two dates.
If the company does not default, the value of the bond converted at the first
conversion opportunity is  B ( 1 + r1 ) / ( 1 - d1 ) at time 1 ( first conversion date). The value
of the bond converted at the second conversion date is b ( 1 + r2 ) / ( 1 - d2 ) at time 2 (second
conversion date). If R is the appropriate discount rate between time 1 and time 2, every
bondholder should convert at time 1 if:  b ( 1 + r1 ) / ( 1 - d1 )  >  b ( 1 + r2 ) / [ ( 1 - d2 ) ( 1
+ R ) ]. In practice, it is normally the case that ( 1 + r2 ) / ( 1 + r1 ) <  ( 1 + R ), so a sufficient
condition to convert on the first conversion date would be:   d1  >  d2 
The general condition, however, is:
( 1 + r1 ) / ( 1 - d1 )  >   ( 1 + r2 ) / [ ( 1 - d2 ) ( 1 + R ) ]
Allowing for default, suppose that c bonds were converted at time 1. At time 2 the
value of the company is V2 and the value of the remaining (B / b) - c bonds would be:
[ ( B - cb ) ( 1 + r2 ) ] / [ 1 - d2 ]    if V2 >  [ ( B - cb ) ( 1 + r2 ) ] / [ 1 - d2 ]
V2 if V2 ≤ [ ( B - cb ) ( 1 + r2 ) ] / [ 1 - d2 ]
At any time t between the two conversion dates, we can express the value of the non
converted bonds as Vt - C { Vt , ( B - cb ) ( 1 + r2 )/ ( 1 - d2 ), time 2 }. At time 1, the value
of the company is V1 and the value of the convertibles is V1 - C { V1 , B ( 1 + r2 ) / ( 1 - d2 )
, time 2 } if all bondholders decide to convert at time 2, and V1 - C {V1 , B (1+ r1 ) / (1- d1),
time 1} if they decide to convert at time 1. Even for some situations where d1 < d2
conversion at time 1 can be optimal. 
The optimal conversion date can also be contemplated from the point of view of the
shareholders. They own a call with two exercise dates. At time 1 they would prefer their call
not to be exercised if the strike price at time 1 is bigger than the strike price at time 2. But
they also have to consider the time value of the call if exercised at time 2. So, even for some
values of the strike price at time 1 ( B [ 1 + r1 ] / [ 1 - d1 ] ) that are smaller than the strike
price at time 2 ( B [ 1 + r2 ] / [ 1 - d2 ] ), shareholders would prefer to exercise at time 2. And
what is optimal for the shareholders is not optimal for the bondholders, because they share
the value of the company.
With real convertibles, as we have already mentioned (see Table 5), it is never the
case that d1 < d2 . Then, every bondholder should convert at the first opportunity. Note that in
order to decide whether to convert or not at the first conversion opportunity, a rational
investor should compare:
18(a) the conversion value of the bonds
(b) the value of the bonds considering only the second, third... conversion
opportunities.
If (a) > (b), bonds should be converted at the first opportunity. 
Given the structure of the convertible bonds issued in Spain, there only two
situations in which it can be better not to convert: 
– If the share price declines substantially during the average period or during the
conversion period.
– If the share price is lower than the minimum price at which the shares are valued
for conversion.
6.2. Different maturity and conversion dates
In sections 3, 4, and 5 we valued convertible zero coupon bonds. For these bonds,
conversion and maturity occur at the same time. For real convertibles, conversion occurs
before maturity. We prove here that when conversion occurs before maturity there is no
significant difference from the value of the convertibles derived in previous sections.
Suppose now that the convertible bonds in section 3. 1. can be converted at time 1
and that the maturity is at time 2, three months after time 1. For conversion the bonds are
valued at $1,000, and at maturity the promised payment is $1,100. 
If the value of the company is greater than $160,000, every bondholder will convert
at time 1 and equation (2.1) holds. But if the value of the company at time 1 is lower than
$160,000, the bondholders do not receive the value of the company because now the
company does not default at time 1. If only c bonds are converted at time 1, equation (22)
must hold: 
c 
––––––––– C ( V1 , 1100 (120 - c) ) + V1 - C(V1 ,1100 (120 - c) )+1000 S1 = V1 (22)
c + 0.75 S1
Equation (22) states that at time 1, the value of the converted bonds plus the value of
the non-converted bonds plus the value of the old shares must equal the value of the
company. The call has three months to maturity. Equation (23) is derived from equation (22). 
C ( V1 ,  1100 (120 - c)                           c
S1 =    ———————————      -    —————   (23)  
1100                                    0.75
The fact that conversion date and maturity (or coupon payment) are not the same
introduces a small discrepancy between these and our previous results. Now, the bondholders
continue to have the possibility of receiving the total value of the company when V1 <
$160,000, but for this they need to reach an agreement among themselves: some bonds will
19be converted and others will not. Now, the company does not default at the conversion date
when V1 < $160,000 because the bonds mature later. For a payment at maturity of
$1,025/bond, three months from conversion to maturity, volatility of 0.4 and riskless interest
rate of 15%, the following values of V1 and c produce a result of S1 = 0 according to
equation (23):
c 1 0.1 0.01 0.001 159
V1 94,000 79,000 68,000 60,000 159,657
For convertibles with a maximum conversion factor, as is normally the case, the fact
that the conversion date is not the maturity date does not produce a large difference either.
For the bondholders not to convert requires that 1+ r2 > (1+ r1 ) / (1 - d 1) , which is never the
case. Note also that if the time value of the call is larger than B ( r2 - r1 ), then
the bondholders will always convert as long as V1 > ( nM + B ) (1 + r1 ) , which is the same
result as was found when conversion and maturity were the same date.
6.3 Conversion period
Normally, the bondholders have a period of 20 days to decide whether to convert.
This is equivalent to adding a new characteristic to the convertible bonds; namely, the bonds
will be converted at a discount on the share price t days before conversion. Conversion date
is date zero and the shares are valued at a discount d off the price at time -t . 
The bondholders will convert if:
B ( 1 + r )
————
(1- d) S- t
———————— Vo >  B ( 1 + r ) ;        
(24)
B ( 1 + r )
————  + n
(1- d) S- t
From equation (24) we know that the bondholders will convert only if n (1 - d) S- t +
B (1 + r ) < Vo . The payoff of the convertibles at date zero will be:
B ( 1 + r )  
——————————— Vo  if n (1 - d ) S- t + B (1 + r ) < Vo 
n (1 - d ) S- t + B (1 + r )
B ( 1 + r ) if B ( 1 + r ) < Vo < n (1 - d ) S- t + B (1 + r )
Vo if Vo < B ( 1 + r )
At time - t , equation (25) must hold:
B ( 1 + r )
V- t  = nS- t + V- t - C( V- t , B(1+r) ) + ———————— C( V- t , B(1+r) + n (1 - d) S- t)  (25)
n (1 - d) S- t + B (1 + r )
20Applying equation (25) to company A, we get equation (26):
120
1000S- t = C( V- t , 120,000 ) - —————— C( V- t , 120,000 + 750 S- t) (26)
0.75 S- t + 120
Solving equation (26) for r=10%, t= 20 days and volatility = 0.4:
V- t 160,000 180,000 200,000 300,000 400,000
S- t 10-8 19.972 39.984 139.9932 239.9948
Solving equation (26) for r=10%, V- t = 400,000 and volatility = 0.4:
t (days) 0 20 180 365
S- t 240 239.9948 236.5909 232.6687
Solving the implicit equation (26) for r=10%, V- t = 400,000 and volatility=1:
t (days) 0 20 180 365
S- t 240 237.4255 214.3827 207.7503
The numerical analysis shows that for subscription periods of 20 days, so long as the
volatility is not very great, the fact that bondholders have a period of time to decide whether
to convert or not does not introduce any significant difference into our previous calculations,
in which we did not consider this period. This very small difference favors the bondholders.
6.4. Discount off the average
As described in the introduction, the shares are not normally valued at a discount on
the share price on one day, but at a discount on an average price. The most common periods
used to compute the average have been the previous month (77 issues), the previous three
months (16 issues), and the previous fifteen days (13 issues).
The main problem in evaluating the impact of the average is that we have to deal
with calls with stochastic striking price17. If the price of the shares has lognormally
distributed returns, and the share price follows the stochastic equation:
d Log (St / S) = µ dt + s dZ , where dZ is a Wiener Process18, 
then log(St / S) is distributed normally, with mean µt and variance s2t. We also know19 that
E(St) = S exp( µt + s2t /2 ), and that Var(St) = S2 exp (2µt + s2t)[exp(s2t) –1].
Assume that the convertible bonds are issued at time -L and can be converted at time
0. For conversion, the shares will not be valued at a discount on the share price at time zero,
but at a discount off the average price between day -T and day -1. This means that a
convertible bond can be exchanged at time 0 for a number of shares equal to 
21B ( 1 + r )                
Nav =  ——————  ,  
( 1 - d ) Sav
1
where Sav = —— { S-T + S-T+1  + S-T+2  + ... + S-1 }.
T
The value of a convertible bond at maturity will be CONVav = Nav * So, where So is
the share price at time zero.
In section 3 we did not consider the average, and we found that a convertible could
be exchanged into N shares, where
B ( 1 + r )               
N  =   —————  ,    (7)
( 1 - d ) So
so that its value at conversion was
B ( 1 + r )               
CONV  =  ————— . 
( 1 - d ) 
It is interesting to explore the difference between the expected value of So and the
expected value of the average. At time -L, the expected value of So is
E(So) = S-L e( µ + s2 /2 )L/365 ,
and the expected value of the average is
E(Sav)= S-L   1  {e( µ + s2 /2 )(L-T)/365 +e( µ + s2 /2 )(L-T+1) /365 +...+
T
+...+e( µ + s2 /2 )(L-1)/365}.
Some algebra permits us to rewrite this expression as
S-L  ( 1 - e-( µ + s2 /2 ) T/365 ) e( µ + s2 /2 ) L/365
E(Sav)=————————————————————        (27)
T ( e
( µ + s2 /2 ) / 365 
- 1 )
We can then compare the expected value of the average with the expected value of
the share price at time 0:
E(So)          e( µ + s2 /2 ) /365  
- 1
—————  = T  ——————————— (28)
E(Sav)         1 - e-( µ + s
2 /2 ) T/365 
22It is worth noting that only T, and not L, appears in formula (28). T is measured in
days and µ and s in annual terms. Table 11 provides estimates of equation (28) for different
combinations of µ and s when the average is taken over 30 days. This table shows that
valuing the shares at a discount off an average of prices, rather than at a discount off the last
day’s price, should imply a higher price for convertible bonds. If investors agree that the
share price follows an Itô process, then the subscription price of the convertibles should be
higher with the average feature than with a discount on a single day’s price20.
7. Conclusion
This paper is a comprehensive study of the convertible bonds used in Spain. Spanish
convertible bonds are different from American convertible bonds. First, the conversion price
of the shares is not fixed in pesetas, but is defined as a percentage reduction of the average
share price over a period of several days before conversion. Second, the conversion option
can be exercised on only two or three different dates. Third, the bonds are not callable.
Fourth, the first conversion opportunity comes only a few months after the subscription date.
Convertible bonds grew increasingly popular in Spain over the period 1984 to 1988.
Issues of convertible bonds accounted for more than $12 billion (1,441 billion pesetas) in that
period. In some of these years, issues of convertible bonds accounted for more than three
times the issues of new shares.
Several formulas for valuing the different kinds of convertible bonds in Spain are
derived using option theory. Optimal conversion policy is also analyzed.
The empirical analysis covers the 248 convertible bonds issued during the period
1984-1990 and offers evidence of a systematic undervaluation of convertible bonds. The
undervaluation of the issues in our sample ranges from 0.25% to 170%, with an average
undervaluation of 21%. The ex-post analysis also shows that investors made systematically
abnormal profits. The comparison between the theoretical value (ex-ante) and the abnormal
return (ex-post) shows that our valuation is a good predictor of the performance of Spanish
convertible bonds.
The optimal conversion policy for the investor is to convert at the first conversion
opportunity, unless the share price declines significantly during the average period or during
the conversion period. If the investor wants to lock in the profit, without taking any risk
(derived from the illiquidity of the new shares) of future fluctuations of the price of the
shares, then, at the conversion date, she must sell short (or sell old shares from her portfolio)
a number of shares equal to the number of shares that she is getting in the conversion. The
empirical analysis also shows that, on average, investors do not follow the optimal
conversion rule.
As shareholders usually have the privilege of subscribing the undervalued bonds
before other investors, we would expect that they would subscribe the whole issue. We have
seen that this is not the case. Shareholders have subscribed, on average, 46.7% of the issues.
This low subscription rate suggests that many shareholders are not aware of the
undervaluation of the convertible bonds
A direct consequence of the undervaluation of the convertibles and of the low
percentage of the issues subscribed by shareholders is the expropriation effect on the
23shareholders who do not subscribe, or subscribe to a smaller proportion of the issue than the
proportion of shares that they hold. Wealth (measured as the undervaluation) is taken away
from these shareholders and given to the non-shareholders who do subscribe. The
expropriation effect in the period 1984 to 1990 adds up to $1.0 billion (125 billion pesetas).
This transfer of wealth could be eliminated if shareholders were able to sell the right to buy
the convertibles. The opportunity of selling this right would eliminate the wealth
expropriation effect.
An explanation for the existence and popularity of convertible bonds in Spain is
offered. The funds that companies can raise by issuing stock are very limited because of the
role of rights (under Spanish law and practice) as a tax-free distribution to investors. This
limitation forces companies to use convertibles to raise equity.
––––––––––––––––
1 Stock dividends are also issued using rights. For example, if a company offers a free new share for every
10 shares owned, an investor (if he is not a shareholder) must purchase 10 rights to get a new share.
2 The shares are not valued at a discount on the share price of a single day, but rather at a discount on the
average of the share price over a number of days before conversion.  Fifteen days and one month are the
most common periods.
3 As we will see later, there are several variations to this structure, but this is the most common.
4 Some of the convertible bonds issued in Spain are valued for conversion at par plus accrued interest (as is
this one from Asland), but others are valued only at par.
5 By law, new shares cannot be issued below par value. Other convertibles also have a maximum conversion
price for the shares.
6 See, for example, Brennan (1980), Brennan and Schwartz (1977), Cox and Rubinstein (1985) and Ingersoll
(1977).
7 The subscription price paid by shareholders was 100% in 240 of the 248 issues in our sample. The
subscription price in the remaining 8 issues was 98% and 99%. The subscription price for non-shareholders
was 100% in all issues.
8 We consider an equivalent fixed income instrument to be one that has similar risk and maturity. We have
made the comparison using fixed income instruments issued by the same company, or by similar
companies in the same industry.
9 Note that the increase in the share price affects the conversion value of the bonds through calculation of the
average and the conversion period.
10 In order to decide whether to convert at the first conversion opportunity, a rational investor should
compare:  (a) the conversion value of the bonds, and (b) the value of the bonds considering only the
second, third... conversion opportunities. If (a) > (b), bonds should be converted at the first opportunity.
11 See, for example, Brennan (1980), Brennan and Schwartz (1977), Cox and Rubinstein (1985) and Ingersol
(1977).
12 This method of evaluating contingent claims can also be found, for example, in Black and Cox (1976) and
Cox and Rubinstein (1985).
13 This assumption about the capital structure of the firm is adopted for the sake of convenience; it is not
necessary for the validity of the results.  If there are more senior securities in the capital structure, we may
interpret V as the sum of the market values of the common stock and the convertibles, rather than the value
of the entire firm.
14 I thank Professor Scott Mason for this suggestion.
15 This assumption about the capital structure of the firm is adopted for the sake of convenience, but is not
necessary for the validity of the results.  If there are more senior securities in the capital structure, we may
interpret V as the sum of the market values of the common stock and the convertibles, rather than the value
of the entire firm.  The solutions developed in this section would be correct if the sum of the common stock
and the convertibles were lognormally distributed; however, they would be inappropriate if the market
value of the entire firm were lognormally distributed.
16 In the prospectus, this constraint appears as: for conversion, the shares will be valued at least at 100%. In
Spain, many share prices are still quoted in percentage of the nominal (par) value.
17 I have to thank Professors Mas-Colell and Mason for their comments.
18 This is equivalent to saying that log (St / S) follows an Itô process. 
19 See J. Cox and Rubinstein, M., Options Markets, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985), page
204.
20 Chapter 11 of my dissertation (Fernandez,1989) develops six methods for approximating the impact of the
average feature.
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New issues of corporate (non-convertible) bonds, convertible bonds 
and shares in Spain
(amounts in billion pesetas)
Corporate     Convertible  Shares
Year bonds bonds     Nominal* Income
Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount
1984 584 12 86 67 169 36 95
1985 569 21 79 74 241 56 154
1986 493 37 393 101 151 66 118
1987 230 43 233 131 243 74 398
1988 384 66 651 135 249 70 313
1989 383 49 368 91 82 64 131
1990 580 20 123 67 103 39 182
——— —— ——— —— —— —— ——
TOTAL 3,223 248 1,933 666 1,238 405 1,391
*  Includes stock splits and stock dividends. Changes in nominal and conversions excluded. In Spain, stock
splits and stock dividends are done by the rights procedure: an investor willing to subscribe a new share
with free subscription price must buy the corresponding number of rights. So, at the time of a stock
dividend, shareholders can choose between getting new shares and selling their rights.
Nominal indicates the nominal value of the shares issued. Income indicates the amount raised by
companies. The difference between the number of issues is the number of issues with free subscription. For
example, in 1988 there were 65 (135-70) issues with free subscription (stock dividends).
Table 2
Issues of convertible bonds in Spain by industry 
(Amounts in billion pesetas)
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Banks. Volume 41 65 161 135 183 181 33 799
Number of issues 5 17 15 12 13 14 3 79
Electric Co. Volume 4 0 148 11 228 60 30 482
Number of issues 1 0 7 2 13 3 2 28
Telephone. Volume 25 0 55 0 45 0 0 125
Number of issues 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 4
Construction.Volume 9 2 14 16 74 34 21 170
Number of issues 3 1 3 3 6 5 4 25
All other. Volume 7 12 16 72 120 93 49 369
Number of issues 2 3 10 26 33 27 11 112
—— —— —— —— —— —— —— ———
Total. Volume 86 79 393 233 651 368 123 1,933
Number of issues 12 21 37 43 66 49 20 248
Different Companies 12 10 26 37 51 43 20 107
25Table 3




Banco Santander and affiliates 267 30
Fecsa 162 6
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and affiliates 139 15
Telefonica 125 4
Banesto 105 6
Banco Hispano Americano 89 4










Banco Exterior and affiliates 24 5
––––– ––––
Subtotal 1,435 104





(Months after subscription) Number of issues
1 -  2 56
2.1 -  4 99
4.1 - 6 45
6.1 -  8 6
8.1 - 10 11
10.1 - 12 15
> 12 16
26Table 5
Convertible bonds in Spain
The first conversion opportunity is ex-ante the most advantageous
Convertibles are structured in such a way that the conditions of the first conversion
opportunity are the most favorable for bondholders.
Characteristics of convertibles
that make the first conversion opportunity Number 
the most favorable for investors of issues
- Only one conversion opportunity 31
- Discount at the first conversion opportunity higher than discount
at the following conversion opportunities 248
- Maximum* in the first conversion opportunity, but not in the following ones 42
- Maximum in the first conversion opportunity smaller than 
maximum in the following conversion opportunities 25
- Minimum in the first conversion opportunity smaller than 
minimum in the following conversion opportunities 14
Issues that have only one of the above characteristics 6
*  88 issues had a maximum share price for conversion (minimum conversion factor) at the first conversion
opportunity, 47 at the second and 22 at the third. The maximum at the first conversion opportunity was
smaller than the share price at the issue date in 55 of the issues. The average {maximum for conversion /
Share price} for these 55 issues was 0.76; the average for the 33 other issues was 1.32. 
The minimum at the first conversion opportunity was smaller than the share price at the issue date in 222 of
the issues.
Table 6
Undervaluation of convertible bonds
Theoretical value as percentage of par
(To be compared with subscription price of 100% of par for every issue)
Range of theoretical values
(% of par) Number of issues
> 150% 15
140% - 150% 9
130% - 140% 14
120% - 130% 67
110% - 120% 97
100.25% - 110% 46
Average theoretical value 121.6%
Weighted average theoretical value 116.4%.
27Table 7
Undervaluation of convertible bonds
Discounted gain* of convertible bonds
(Actual return over fixed income instrument of equivalent risk)
Range of discounted gain Number of issues
> 50% 31
40% - 50% 7
30% - 40% 20
20% - 30% 31
10% - 20% 47
0% - 10% 46
< 0% (loss) 34
Average discounted gain 22.5%
Weighted average discounted gain 16.8%
* We define discounted gain as the gain over an equivalent fixed income instrument. We consider a fixed
income instrument to be equivalent if it has similar risk and maturity. We have made the comparison using
fixed income instruments issued by the same company, or by similar companies in the same industry. For
example, consider a company that simultaneously issues convertible bonds and straight bonds, both with
subscription price of 100. Conversion occurred one year later, and the conversion value was 132. The
annual coupon of the fixed income instruments was 10%, so the value of the straight bond at the conversion
date was 110. Therefore, the discounted gain was 20% ([132/110] - 1).
Table 8
Convertible bonds in Spain
Discounted gain by selecting convertibles according to formulas 
(1984 - 1990)
Buying convertibles ...The discounted gain**
with value*... would have been
150% 55.9%
125 - 150% 37.8%
115 - 125% 20.5%
110 - 115% 16.1%
105 - 110% 7.3%
100 - 105% 1.9%
—————— ————
All 22.5%
*  Value is the result of applying the formulas that we develop in part II to the convertible bonds at the issue
date. The value is given as a percentage of the nominal value of the bond. This value can be compared with
the subscription price of the convertibles (100% of the nominal value).
** We define discounted gain as the gain over an equivalent fixed income instrument. We consider a fixed
income instrument to be equivalent if it has similar risk and maturity. We have made the comparison using
fixed income instruments issued by the same company, or by similar companies in the same industry. For
example, consider a company that simultaneously issues convertible bonds and straight bonds, both with
subscription price of 100.  Conversion occurred one year later, and the conversion value was 132.  The
annual coupon of the fixed income instruments was 10%, so the value of the straight bond at the conversion
date was 110. Therefore, the discounted gain was 20% ([132/110] - 1).
28Table 9
Bonds converted at the first conversion opportunity
Converted bonds










0-10%   6.8%
100.0%
Converted bonds
(% of the issue) % of the issues  Discounted gain
Issues in which conversion 
at the first opportunity was 
not optimal (average) 26.6% 13.2% -13.6%
Issues in which conversion 
at the first opportunity was 
optimal (average) 72.1% 86.8% 31.7%
Average conversion at the first opportunity: 63.84% of the issues.
Table 10
Bonds subscribed by shareholders
Range of subscription  Average 
by shareholders value of the bonds
(% of the issues) (% of face value)
100% 126.4%
80 - 99% 123.1%
60 - 79% 146.0%
40 - 59% 121.9%
20 - 39% 137.2%
2 - 19% 116.7%
Average subscription by shareholders:  52% of the issues.
29Table 11
E(So)/E(Saverage) for different values of µ and s, when the average is 
calculated over a period of 30 days
E(So)/E(Saverage)
µ s=0 s=0.2 s=0.4 s=0.6 s= 1
0% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02
1% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02
5% 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02
10% 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03
15% 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03
20% 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03
25% 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03
30% 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03
35% 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.04
40% 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.04
E(So)                 e
( µ + s2 /2 ) /365   
- 1
————— = T  ———————————
E(Sav)                1 - e-( µ + s2 /2 ) T/365 
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